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A combination of interconnection between societies so strong that governments and peoples alike assume
humanity now lives in a condition of globalization and increasing prominence of scientific and technical
matters in everyday life has created need for scientists and engineers to participate in international as well
as national debates about solving problems, applying technologies to particular purposes, and avoiding or
minimizing serious harm. While participation in international debates requires sensitivity to cultural,
organizational, and economic differences between societies, it resembles participation in national debates
because scientists and engineers can take any of several roles, the political institutions through which
cooperation is organized affect the process and outcome of debates, and features of the problem at hand
affect the implementation of policies or standards adopted in international forums.
I.

The potential roles of scientists or engineers.

Policy-makers and others concerned with a particular issue seek any or all of several types of expert advice
depending on how well the issue is understood and how urgent addressing it appears to be. Expert advice
may consist of:
1.) trend-spotting, the documenting of observable changes in physical processes or conditions;
2.) theory-building, the development of causal explanations for the observed changes;
3.) theory-testing, the organization of experiments or the acquisition of additional data for testing
the explanations,
4.) communicating, the presentation of trend-spotting, theory-building, and theory-testing in terms
understandable to policy-makers and other non-scientists, and
5.) applied-policy analysis, the development of detailed programs for addressing a problem.1

1 Typology of expert advice taken from Lawrence E. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy; Negotiating More Effective Global
Agreements, 76-77. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
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Trend-spotting and theory-building are typically most prominent early in consideration of an issue when
governments and others are trying to understand the problem. Results confirmed by theory testers feed
into the negotiation phase, where communicating and applied policy analysis come to the fore as
governments develop their programs for coordinated action. Trend-spotting continues as agreements are
implemented. If new observations call existing causal models into question, theory building and theory
testing will be revived. In any event, communicating and applied policy analysis will be needed for
discussions of improving compliance with the agreement or amending it to better address the problem.
Some scientists participate directly in the policy making process because they serve as government
officials. A few individuals with scientific training have taken up careers in politics and risen to top national
positions; these include Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the UK in 1975-1990, and Angela Merkel,
Chancellor of Germany since November 2005, who worked as research scientists, and Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, President of Iran since August 2005, who completed a degree in civil engineering. A larger
number of scientists and engineers hold civil service positions in national ministries or other agencies with
responsibility for developing or implementing policy on particular issues. While working for their particular
country, government employed scientists and engineers can become involved in international cooperation
either as a member of their country’s delegation to an intergovernmental conference or organization or as
their country’s participant in a transgovernmental network of peer officials assuring coordination of their
respective governments’ efforts on some problem. They may even be lent temporarily to an
intergovernmental organization or another government’s counterpart agency.
Scientists and engineers employed by private organizations – business firms, universities, professional
associations, testing institutes – can become involved in policy discussions through an advisory role.
These scientists and engineers do not participate in making decisions, but their comments influence
agreements by indicating what goals are or are not feasible given the current state of scientific or
engineering knowledge and by suggesting the most efficacious means of action to reach the goals. Eight
such roles exist:
1. Member of an expert advisory body created by an intergovernmental organization. Intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) dealing with areas where technical or scientific information is important for policy
coordination frequently rely on standing or temporary expert advisory committees. Their role publicized
widely when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2007. The IPCC was created by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the UN
Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 1988 to help policy-makers by issuing periodic reports
summarizing the increasing number of research results in atmospheric science and assessing the
current state of knowledge regarding gaseous emissions and their effect on world climate.2 The
Codex Alimentarius Commission, an expert body maintained jointly by the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), develops recommendations regarding
the safety of food, food additives and preservatives, and methods of processing food. 3 The UN
General Assembly’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has a scientific and
technical subcommittee that works on promoting international cooperation in use of space technology
See its website at http://www.ipcc.ch/ (accessed 4 June 2009). The process used to write reports is summarized in the diagram
at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm (accessed 4 June 2009).
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Information about the Commission and the Standards it has developed is available at www.who.org/codex
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and advises its parent Committee on the technical implications of policy decisions, such as the rules for
marking launchers and objects placed in space that appear in the Registration Agreement.4
The precise extent to which experts can operate as fellow professionals following the best practices of
expert reasoning in formulating recommendations varies considerably. This is strongly influenced by the
composition and terms of appointment to the particular advisory body. The variety of composition can be
appreciated by looking more closely at two expert bodies involved in international cooperation on food
safety. The UN Codex Alimentarius Commission works through subcommissions and committees given
the task of developing recommendations on particular topics. Most of them have a mixed membership,
drawing members from the technical services of national agricultural ministries, other government
agencies, and major food processing firms. Inclusion of industry-employed scientists is controversial,
inspiring complaints from leftist commentators that subcommissions and committees simply endorse
industry desires. In contrast, the Committee on Toxicological Effects of Additives includes only research
scientists serving as individual experts.5 One-time committees established to produce a particular study,
such as the group producing the WHO-FAO Study on Diet, Nutrition, and the Prevention of Chronic
Diseases in 2003,6 are more likely to be drawn from universities and research institutes.
IGOs structure expert advisory committees in several ways, with the particular structure selected with an
eye to having a body that will be accepted as a credible source of the particular type of expert advice
needed. The structure depends much less on the type of advice than on the political dynamics.
Sometimes an international secretariat serves as a filter, commissioning studies from groups of scientists
likely to have some bias owing to their employment affiliation, aggregating the results, and presenting
recommendations for the governments. Enforcement of and amendment of lists of endangered species for
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) relies on advice from scientists
working for various environmental groups. Governments respect the professionalism of the particular
scientists, but also rely on the Secretariat’s incentive to identify good information as a way to correct for the
likely bias. When different sets of potential expert advisers appear to have different bases, governments
can build in corrections by including members of each set in the advisory body. Alternately, they may
establish a two-step process in which scientists serving as individual experts lay out trends and suggest
theories while applied-policy analysis is undertaken later by scientists serving as government designees
and selected to ensure participation from every region of the world.7 In the Convention for Protection of the
M.J. Peterson, International Regimes for the Final Frontier. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Also see
www.un.org
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Pierre Dobbert, “Food and Agriculture” in Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. Joyner eds., United Nations Legal Order.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Diet, Nutrition, and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases, WHO Technical Report Series 916, available at
www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/who_fao_expert_report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2011). Background is provided in Nishida et al,
“The Joint WHO-FAO Expert Consultation on diet, nutrition, and the prevention of chronic diseases,” Pubic Health Nutrition 7
(1A): 245-250 (200x).

6

Though scientists and engineers believe good science or good engineering is the same everywhere, governments, particularly
of developing countries, often want to hear from “their own” scientists. As Wilbert Chapman of the US Fisheries Service
explained when proposing a regional committee to assess tuna populations and develop management regulations for the InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission in 1945, “[we need] to gain the facts in conjunction with the Latinos so they will believe
them.” As cited in MJ Peterson, “International Fisheries Management” In Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy
(Eds). Institutions for the Earth (pp 249-305). Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1993
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Stratospheric Ozone Layer, the scientific assessment body deals with ongoing trend-spotting while the
technical assessment body handles the applied-policy analysis needed to develop substitutes for any
additional chemical substances identified as ozone-depleters.
The terms of appointment help define an advisory group’s work, and their significance can be seen by
contrasting the Codex Commission with the WHO Committee on International Surveillance of
Communicable Diseases, which is responsible for proposing revisions to WHO’s various sets of
regulations. Unlike the Codex committees, where members are designated by individual governments,
members of the Committee on International Surveillance are appointed by WHO’s Director-General and
their work is governed by a WHO staff regulation stating that the members serve the WHO exclusively and
may not request or receive instructions from any government.8 Experts drawn from government service are
clearly acceptable to the government sending them. Even the experts employed outside government are
unlikely to be strong critics of their country’s political regime. They are also likely to be relatively senior,
known to government officials and fellow scientists alike, since it takes time to establish credentials as an
expert in a particular area. Some governments apply more direct “political litmus tests” and recommend
only persons known to strongly support the government’s position on the matters addressed by the IGO
expert body. Other governments are broader in their tolerance. Governments of smaller countries,
particularly those in the “low” and “middle” income levels of development, may have limited choice because
of the scientific or engineering communities in their countries are relatively small.
2. Member of a national expert advisory body. Even when an IGO or international conference has its own
advisory bodies, individual countries often have national expert advisory bodies able to provide the
country’s delegation with information and suggestions on the topics being discussed internationally.
This is particularly likely in the larger and wealthier countries with large scientific and engineering
communities. In the USA, much scientific advice is provided through the National Research Council,
which draws upon experts in particular fields as government agencies seek advice.9 In the United
Kingdom, the Royal Society maintains a similar process of convening expert study groups.10
3. Nongovernmental organization (NGO) or social group representative at an intergovernmental
organization or international conference. As IGOs and international conferences have become more
open to expressions of opinion from NGOs, transnational social movements, or – in the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development – members of particular social constituencies like farmers,
labor, women, and youth, some scientists and engineers have represented NGOs, constituencies, or
other entities. While these representatives cannot speak at meetings or introduce formal proposals,
they can follow proceedings and present opinions and ideas to the national delegates who negotiate
and adopt the declarations, action plans, or other documents issued by the IGO or conference.
4. Member of NGO or social group communicating ideas and information to their country’s officials
participating in a transgovernmental network. Though the members of transgovernmental networks
seldom gather for formal meetings, their ongoing interactions often inspire NGOs, social groups, and
8

José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 246.

Information on the National Research Council and its procedures is available at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/nrc/PoliciesandProcedures/index.htm.
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Information on the Royal Society’s activities is available at www.royalsociety.org/policy.
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business firms to link up in their own networks to coordinate information provision and policy advocacy
with the various national members of the transgovernmental network.
5. Member of private standard-setting body. Individual engineers are more likely than individual scientists
to serve as a member of a private standards-setting body or of one of the technical committees drafting
recommended standards since most of these efforts relate to standards for physical products or
production processes.
6. Leader of a professional association. National and transnational professional associations typically
avoid involvement in political controversy for three reasons: to avoid tensions among members holding
different political views, to maintain their social role as experts, and to avert difficulties with the
government in countries where traditions of allowing private self-organization are weakly established.
Occasionally, however, professional associations do take stands on matters clearly within the domain
of their expertise that have become the subject of international policy debate. When debate over
climate change intensified in the USA after release of the IPCC’s Third Assessment in 2001,11 both the
American Meteorological Society and the American Geophysical Union issued statements supporting
the Assessment report of scientific consensus that human-caused greenhouse gas emissions were
increasing atmospheric temperatures to the point of inducing global warming.12
7. Participant in a scientific or engineering epistemic community seeking to exert influence transnationally.
An epistemic community is a group of scientists or engineers who share substantive expertise on some
matter, a common way of acquiring and assessing empirical evidence about the state of the world and
the causal processes that produce that state, a belief that international cooperation is needed to
address the problem, and a particular proposal for organizing that cooperation. An epistemic
community operates differently from economic interests and other politically active groups because of
its distinctive patterns of developing and amending policy proposals. These patterns are not set by the
calculations of material interest that typically motivate economic interests or the broad normative
propositions that motivate many other sorts of groups; epistemic communities are guided by their
scientifically established understandings regarding causes and solutions of the problem at hand.13
Before establishment of the IPCC in 1988, atmospheric scientists worried about global warming had
gotten together on their own and sought media attention for their research and concerns.
8. Public Intellectual/Citizen Advocate. Individual scientists and engineers can also enter policy debates
directly as public intellectuals or citizen advocates addressing the general public – including any
elected or career government officials in the audience – through mass media or blogs.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, 2001. Available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/vol4/english/index.htm. (Accessed 4 June 2009).
11

12 American Meteorological Society, “Climate change research: issues for atmospheric and related sciences,” February 2003
available at www.ametsoc.otg/POLICY/climatechangeresearch_2003.html (accessed January 18, 2011); American Geophysical
Union, “Human impacts on climate,” December 2003, available at www.agu.org/sci_soc/policy/positions/climate_change.shtml
(accessed June 2009 ).

The characteristics and workings of epistemic communities are discussed in Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and
International Policy Coordination, International Organization 46(1) pp. 1-35 (1992).
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II. Political Dynamics Scientists and Engineers Need to Understand
The Political Process
Modified by adjectives, the word “politics” has been applied to activities ranging from competition for
influence and superior managers’ attention in the workplace (“office” or “workplace” politics), through
participation in political parties’ efforts to win elections (“electoral politics”), through participation in legal
organizing activities (“conventional politics”) through participation in sometimes-legal, sometimes-illegal
protest activities intended to force a government to change policies (“contentious politics”) to participation in
efforts to overthrow a government (“revolutionary politics”). The unadorned noun “politics” is generally used
to denote processes of using formal political institutions to make collective decisions that define social
goals and the means by which those goals will be attained. Defined in this way, the political process is best
understood as characterized by several phases with alternate paths and feedbacks that frequently create a
continuous loop of cycling through the phases as goals are redefined or means shifted.14
In the usual order of presentation, the phases of the political process are:
1. Demand formulation. The political process starts outside the public realm, in individuals’ or groups’
perception that some concern, issue, or problem requires society-wide attention because individual
or group action cannot address it effectively. An individual or group that believes it can handle
something effectively with its own effort and resources will not define that matter as “political;” it will
simply deal with the matter itself. Individuals or groups will raise political demands whenever
engaging the centralized administrative and enforcement structures of government appears
necessary to satisfactory action on the matter. Matters get on the international level agenda, and
are addressed by groups of governments or by IGOs when enough governments are persuaded
that the matter deserves group or IGO consideration.
2. Agenda setting. While any individual or group can come up with a political demand, securing
attention requires persuading others that the demand deserves attention from the relevant political
institutions. Here it is important to distinguish between items gaining public attention in the sense of
being reported in the media, discussed on blogs, or talked about among family, friends, and
neighbors. Real and imagined details of celebrities’ personal lives receive considerable public
attention, but seldom inspire political demands because no one thinks they require some decision
out of government. Large electrical power outages are reported, but inspire political demands only
when restoration of the grid takes longer than people think is reasonable. Similarly, the high postWorld War II growth of human population was discussed among demographers and
environmentalists as a “population explosion” for several years before the government of Malta
asked in 1962 that it be added to the agenda of the UN General Assembly.
Many demands never reach the agenda of actively considered political concerns. Some fail to
reach the agenda because they appeal to very few others; some fail because of opposition from
influential persons or groups who use their influence to keep the demand off the agenda. Over time
persistent demanders can gain more attention, gain support from those who were initially indifferent,
or even weaken opposition to considering the demand, but this does require more effort. At the
international level, demands advanced by major countries or groups of countries are more likely to
14

The clearest statements of this conception include John Kingdon ; Reference to discussions.

6

Responsible participation by Scientists and Engineers in International Political Process
secure attention than demands from small countries. Similarly, non-state actors like multinational
corporations, large nongovernmental organizations based in the industrial countries, and
transnational advocacy coalitions with members in major countries find it easier to gain attention
than those active only in one or a few countries or lacking sufficient resources to maintain up-to-date
websites, send members to IGO meetings, or engage in protests in major cities where they will get
international media attention.
3. Consideration. Inclusion on the agenda is followed by active consideration of the issue. This can
involve any of several activities, including asking advisory bodies for data about conditions and
advice about the feasibility of possible courses of action, during which goals are defined and various
means for their attainment are suggested. The discussions and negotiations that form the largest
part of consideration in an international organization or conference are particularly challenging
because governments are concerned with developing proposals that will simultaneously attract
enough support from other governments to be adopted in the international body and from enough
government agencies and private actors at home to be accepted and implemented.
Consideration usually leads to decision-making, but the shift to decision may be delayed if no
proposal attracts sufficient support. Supporters believing they will be able to secure more support if
they have more time to negotiate or to persuade can “mark time” by sending (or returning) the
matter to a committee or by commissioning more studies. Within countries, legislative committees,
special commissions of inquiry, requests for advice from scientific or technical groups, public
hearings, and procedures for securing public comments on proposed policies can all be used to
create delay. Proposals can also be “buried” – deferred by opponents expecting to prevent a
decision by diverting the discussion to a legislative committee or to some advisory body where
opponents predominate and can be relied upon to avoid the matter. Internationally, IGO
secretariats, ad hoc commissions, and advisory bodies can fulfill similar delay or burial functions.
4. Decision. Decision is the moment of determining what proposal, if any, will be adopted as policy. In
formal organizations, decision involves some explicit, pre-defined, voting procedure specifying the
amount of support required to consider the proposal adopted.
In parliamentary countries, where the prime minister and other heads of government departments
are the leaders of the political party or coalition of political parties that won the most recent
legislative election, this link of the executive and legislative branches normally assures the
government of a majority for any proposal it puts forward. In countries where the executive branch
leaders and the legislature are elected separately, different parties may control each and the
executive face a much harder time getting proposals accepted. Within intergovernmental
organizations, proposals are not brought up for a vote until supporters are confident that they have
enough support to get them adopted.
5. Implementation. Unless the decision specifies doing nothing, it needs to be implemented – followed
by actions that turn the words of the decision into a real world outcome. Opponents and lukewarm
supporters can undermine a decision at the implementation phase through inaction; some
opponents may go further and act contrary to the terms of the decision. Even inaction can
effectively nullify a decision if it is sufficiently widespread.

7

Responsible participation by Scientists and Engineers in International Political Process
The opportunities for weakening a decision afterward through inaction, slow action, or incomplete
action are even greater at the international level where implementation is typically done by individual
governments’ officials rather than a strong, centralized regional or global agency. This is true even
in the European Union, though the EU does have better procedures for monitoring national action
and more ways to prod member governments into action than other IGOs.
6. Review. All policies are projections resting on assumptions that implementation will follow and that
the particular set of actions endorsed in the decision will produce the desired outcome. Review is
the process of continuously or periodically assessing the extent to which implementation has
occurred and to which the actions taken are contributing to attainment of the goal. Consciousness
that even complete implementation may not lead to goal attainment is particularly strong among
students of international environmental politics, who routinely distinguish between “compliance with”
– governments and others carrying out the actions prescribed – and “effectiveness of” – the actual
environmental improvement gained from those actions – an environmental agreement. Reviews
revealing weak implementation are likely to trigger efforts to get laggards to perform better, even
including follow-up decisions strengthening incentives to implement. Reviews revealing little
progress towards stated goals despite considerable implementation are likely to trigger
reconsideration of the policy itself. When explicit follow-up decisions revising implementation
schemes or adopting new policies are desired, action shifts back to agenda-setting if there is wide
disagreement on the need for follow-up decisions or a new policy, or to consideration if there is.
Tacit changes can be produced more easily, through shared interpretations of rules or
understandings that certain actions can be omitted.
This summary of the process might suggest a neat linear process from demand formulation to review.
Actual politics is far messier: the process can stall in any of the phases. If it does, revival may require
shifting back into previous phase to re-start the process. The various ways the process can stall and the
pathways through which it might be restarted and indicated in Figure 1.
Each intergovernmental organization or standards-setting bodies has procedures for taking up, considering,
and deciding on policy questions. Though the exact agenda-setting and decision making procedures vary
from organization to organization, they can be divided into a number of generic types, each with features
that influence how the political process plays out. Understanding the implications of these generic features
and identifying which features have been combined to what effect in the rules of a particular organization
are essential to effective participation in it.
Rules for Agenda-Setting
In most IGOs, agenda-setting is bounded by the limits of the organization’s mandate. These limits can be
geographic – the European Union, the African Union, the Organization of American States, the Arab
League, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations all operate among a regionally defined set of
member states. They can be substantive – each of the UN Specialized Agencies, Offices, and Programs
addresses particular issues; only the General Assembly has authority to deal with any sort of international
question.15 They can be a combination of both – the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties deal with
15

United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 10.
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questions arising from management of activity on the Antarctic continent or islands and seas south of the
60 degree S latitude line.16
Many IGOs have an open agenda: each member state has the right to propose as many agenda items as it
wishes. Some IGO bodies establish a deadline so that items are proposed before the session of meetings
starts; others allow items to be proposed during the session. Where such a rule prevails, the nominal
agenda is usually longer than can be handled at the current session because of time constraints. Items
that interest few other member states are accordingly ignored or put off until a later meeting. The items
that are left form the IGO’s effective agenda and move on to the consideration phase.
Rules for Decision
Each international conference and intergovernmental organization has its own decision rules. These
specify a.) how much support is required for adopting a decision and b.) whether that decision is a
recommendation that member states may take up or ignore as they choose, or a binding decision that they
are expected to follow.
Rules defining the amount of support needed can vary in two ways: by the number of votes each member
state may cast, and by the size of the majority needed for adoption. International conferences and most
IGOs operate under a one state-one vote rule in which every member state casts a single vote. Some
IGOs, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union, use systems of
weighted voting in which member states have varying numbers of votes. The number of votes assigned to
a particular member may be based on population size (as in the EU), relative size of the national economy
(as in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), or any other criterion that the member states
agree to use when setting up the organization.
IGOs and international conferences can use any of several rules defining the size of the majority required
to adopt decisions:

16



unanimity: all members must support the decision;



consensus: all or nearly all members must either support the decision or at least let the decision be
adopted even though they are not fully persuaded;



supermajority: a majority larger than 50% plus 1 of the votes cast: two-thirds (typically defined as
67% of the voters) and three-fourths (75% of the voters) are the most commonly used
supermajority rules, but others have been adopted in particular organizations;



simple majority: a majority consisting of 50% plus 1 of the votes cast;



veto: a majority rule modified by an additional requirement that certain members vote with the
majority: the UN Security Council where any one of the five Permanent Members (Britain, China,
France, Russia, USA) can stop a decision by a negative vote is the most prominent use of this rule.

Antarctic Treaty, 1959, Article VI.
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Combining variation in the number of votes each member state casts and in the number of votes needed
for adoption yields 10 logical possibilities:

unanimity

consensus

supermajority

simple majority

veto

1 vote per
state
weighted
voting
Weighted voting and supermajority can be combined to produce rules balancing extra voting rights for
larger or wealthier members with assurances to smaller or poorer members that the largest vote holders
will not be able to adopt major decisions on their own. The IMF requirement that decisions to change
quotas (the amount of money each member state commits to the fund) require that 85% of the votes be
cast in favor. This rule is usually described as favoring the wealthiest members because it allows the USA
(16.74% of the votes) or France, Germany, and the UK together (15.57% of the votes) to prevent change.
Yet, it also means that any coalition of members able to muster more than 15% of the votes can do the
same. Japan’s 6.01% give East Asian members a good start towards blocking, and if all developing
countries voted together, their cumulative percent of the vote would also suffice.17 In the European Union,
the European Council, the executive body of member states, and the European Parliament both distribute
votes among member states on a weighted basis. In the Council, this is done by giving each member
state’s representative varying numbers of votes; in the European Parliament this is done by giving each
state represented by a different number of members holding one vote each.18
The impact of different voting rules becomes apparent in the following examples of decision-making in a
hypothetical IGO having 20 member states:
Distribution of votes
one vote per state
same
same
same

Majority required
simple
2/3s majority
3/4s majority
unanimity

States 1-5 hold 5 votes each; States
6-10 hold 3 votes each; the rest hold
1 vote each (60 votes total)

simple (31 votes)

same
2/3s majority (40 votes)
same

3/4s majority (45 votes)

Number of supporting members needed
11
14
15
20
Least: 7
(states 1-5 and any 2 of states 6-10)
Most: 17
(states 11-20, states 6-10, plus any 2 of
states 1-5)
Least: 10
(states 1-5 and 6-10)
Most: 18
(states 11-20, states 6-10, plus any 3 of
states 1-5)
Least: 15

Distribution of votes among IMF members updated in January 2011. Available from
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (accessed 18 January 2011)
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same

unanimity

(states 1-5 and 6-10 plus any 5 of states
11-20)
Most: 19
(states 11-20, states 6-10, plus any 4 of
states 1-5)
20

As the table indicates, the size of the majority needed for adoption is important because it determines the
number of members who must be persuaded by a proposal. A typical UN-related organization has at least
150 member states. In an IGO that size, 76 members are a simple majority, 101 are a 2/3s majority, and
113 are a 3/4s majority. The larger the majority required the harder supporters of proposals have to work
on attracting support. This usually requires modifying proposals to meet others’ objections, and may – if
disagreement is strong – mean watering down proposals by removing any element inspiring serious
objection. However, a strong sense of urgency to address a problem and a willingness to try new
approaches can permit escape from the dynamics of “least common denominator” politics.
III. Scientists and Engineers in International Level Policy-Making Processes
Operating in or with IGOs.
The opportunities for influencing decisions open to scientists and engineers in advisory roles as members
of expert committees or representatives of NGOs and social groups vary considerably across IGOs. These
opportunities will be greater when any of four conditions are present, and particularly wide when all four
exist:19
1. Most member states have political cultures and ideologies receptive to self-organizing by, and
comments or suggestions from interest groups, social movements, and individual citizens and these
impulses are carried into the IGO. States vary considerably in their receptivity to NGO activity.
Though both the fascist and Leninist regimes that sought to control all aspects of national life have
disappeared, some governments still seek to channel group, movement, and citizen activity. One
device for exercising such control is through creation of nominally independent but actually
government-guided organizations (known to students of politics as “government-organized
nongovernmental organizations” or GONGOs).
2. The particular IGO forum dealing with the problem has already developed formal rules or informal
practices encouraging nonstate actor observation at meetings, contact with the secretariat and
national delegations, or holding their own “parallel forums” (a common practice at UN-sponsored
global conferences) for developing joint statements issued to the media and to conference
participants.
3. The particular IGO is part of a “family” or “system” of related IGOs and takes cues from another IGO
in the system that uses expert advisory committees extensively or allows representatives of nonstate
actors to observe meetings and communicate with the secretariat or national delegations;

Drawn from discussions in Robert W. Cox and Harold Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International
Organization. New Haven: Yale University Press 1974; Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990; Dennis Dijkzuel, The Management of Multilateral Organizations. The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1997.
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4. The IGO’s secretariat has discretion to establish expert committees and/or ability to choose who will
be invited to observe meetings or communicate with the organization, and uses that discretion to
foster such contacts.
Because they typically meet only once, international conferences do not use expert advisory bodies.
However, the process of getting governments to agree on holding a conference may be assisted by an
expert committee created by an IGO, national expert bodies, or a transnational epistemic community.
IGOs, with their continuously functioning secretariats and decision-making bodies meeting in regularly
scheduled repeated sessions, have more scope for using expert advisers and advisory committees. Expert
bodies are very common in IGOs dealing with issues or problems that member states’ governments regard
as technical. They may be developed in other IGOs for answering particular technical questions that arise
in the course of considering other issues.
Operating in or with networks
Epistemic communities, transnational advocacy coalitions, and social movements tend to prefer network
organization over bureaucratic hierarchy. Their members are linked together more by shared ideas –
political ideologies, moral values, visions of the good society – and shared concerns about particular issues
than by superior-subordinate relations and job descriptions. As private entities rather than government
agencies (or “nonstate actors” in the parlance of international relations scholars), networks gain entrée into
international policy processes through contacts with IGOs, contacts in the governments of particularly
influential states, or both.
IV. The Impact of Problem Characteristics on Policy
Whether decisions, implementation and review occur in an organization or a network determines how they
proceed, but has little effect on the ease or extent to which they succeed. Ease of proceeding and degree
of success are affected far more by certain characteristics of the problem or issue itself. The most
important characteristics are the type of cooperation involved and the geographical extent of the problem.
The extent to which different preferences on the matter parallel or cut across preexisting political
alignments or economic connections may also affect the likelihood of stalemate in the decision phase or
success in implementation.
Public choice theorists routinely distinguish between two types of cooperation.20 Collaboration arises when
member states agree on a common goal but different ways of reaching the goal offer each participating
state a different net gain. For example, governments can easily agree on the general goal of reduce air
pollution because the health and other benefits are clear today. However, a decision to reduce air pollution
by focusing primarily on sulfur emissions will require states using bituminous (“soft”) coal as their major fuel
to make greater changes in economic activity than states using natural gas. The states facing high costs
will prefer focusing on some other type of emission or else seek “compensation” for their higher costs
through such related devices as loan programs or longer periods of time for reaching the agreed emissions
limit. Coordination arises when states agree on the goal and do not face significant differences in net gain
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E.g., Kenneth Oye, “Cooperation under Anarchy,” World Politics (1985).
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from a particular and obviously effective method of reaching it. Agreement on the goal will be followed by
rapid convergence on the method.
The geographical extent of the problem, whether considered in terms of the benefits to be provided to
participants or the undesired outcomes to be avoided, influences how many states need to be involved.
Some problems, such as maintenance of the stratospheric ozone layer or avoidance of additional humaninduced atmospheric warming, need to be addressed globally. The greenhouse gasses that yield
atmospheric warming are produced in all countries (though about 80% came from 25 countries in 200521);
reducing total emissions requires not only that current large emitters cut back but that current small emitters
also limit their increases. While the chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) and freons that contributed the most to
ozone depletion in 1990 were manufactured by a few large chemical companies in industrial states, the
combination of higher cost for the less-damaging substitutes and easily-diffused manufacturing technology
for CFCs and freons meant that only a global agreement to halt CFC and Freon use could prevent shifting
production to other countries. Other problems, such as management of a river watershed, affect a
particular region and can be handled by the states in that region. A few problems require cross-regional
cooperation among a large number of states, but less than global cooperation, because some countries
provide neither sources of nor solutions to the problem. This pattern characterizes efforts to assure safety
of ocean navigation and prevention of pollution from ships; states that have no ports and register no ships
do not need to be involved.
Existing political alignments and economic connections affect the way governments perceive problems. In
the 1970s the USSR was eager to discuss the problem of long-range transboundary air pollution in the UN
Economic Commission for Europe because it was one of the few issues on which opinions were not frozen
into the Cold War rivalry. Developing country worries that environmental issues will be used to justify
decisions that would limit their prospects for development have been a constant theme in international
environmental negotiations and a strong reason for their insistence that environmental issues be handled in
forums operating under one state-one vote rules.
Implementation and review are very sensitive to the resources applied to those phases of the process.
Implementers, whether IGOs, transgovernmental networks, national administrative agencies, or private
entities, need money, equipment, and personnel to perform their tasks adequately. Governments’
reluctance to establish autonomously-funded IGOs has kept most implementation in the hands of national
agencies, with all the unevenness that results from the wide variation in size and funding of administrative
agencies around the world. This is true even in the European Union, where the EU’s revenues are defined
shares of the tariff and value-added tax (VAT) revenues collected by the member states. Administrative
unevenness occurs even in the EU, though it is less noticeable there than in other parts of the world
because most members have relatively large and relatively well-funded administrative agencies.
Both implementation and review depend on the competence of the persons carrying them out. This has
been acknowledged internationally in the proliferation of capacity-building programs to help developing
countries train experts and administrators in scientific and technical fields. Intergovernmental organizations
also face capacity problems. The combination of norms calling for recruitment of IGO staff from a wide
selection of member states (most elaborately formalized in the UN system specification of “desirable
Calculated from the World Resource Institute’s data on greenhouse gas emissions by type and source country at
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/data_tables/cli3_2005.pdf (accessed 25 June 2009.)
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ranges” from each member state in the hiring of professional-level staff), practices of allowing member
governments to “earmark” particular positions for their own nationals, and the existence of small
professional communities in many states often means that technical competence comes fairly far down the
list of criteria for hiring. The general problem of balancing among multiple criteria in hiring is shared by
governments and other sorts of organizations as well. However, the obstacles to change seem to be
greater in IGOs than elsewhere, partly because member states pay close attention to the nationalities of
staff and perhaps because scandals produced by incompetence in IGOs usually receive little public
attention because they seem so remote from citizens’ daily concerns.
Maintaining competence, securing implementation, and having good review are enhanced whenever
governments and private stakeholders can observe events and assess the extent of implementation and
the amount of progress toward goals using widely-agreed measurements of success. In many technical
fields, there are agreed physical measures, such as % of different gasses in the atmosphere or parts per
million of contaminants in water, in which case the main problems of implementation review involve timely
and honest provision of data. Success in containing contagious diseases can be assessed with timely
reports of additional cases – continued or accelerating increase in new cases indicating spread and
decrease in new cases indicating containment.
Chart: Allocations of Votes in European Union Institutions
Member country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain

Votes in Council
10
12
10
4
12
7
4
7
29
29
12
12
7
29
4
7
4
3
13
27
12
14
7
4
27

members of Parliament
18
24
18
6
24
14
6
14
78
99
24
24
13
78
9
13
6
5
27
54
24
35
14
7
54

% of EU population
1.67%
2.14%
1.57%
1.63%
2.08%
1.10%
0.28%
1.06%
12.37%
16.84%
2.26%
2.06%
0.84%
11.93%
0.47%
0.69%
0.10%
0.08%
3.30%
7.80%
2.14%
4.40%
1.10%
0.41%
8.77%

population (2005)
8.2 million
10.5 million
7.7 million
0.8 million
10.2 million
5.4 million
1.4 million
5.2 million
60.6 million
82.5 million
11.1 million
10.1 million
4.1 million
58.5 million
2.3 million
3.4 million
0.5 million
0.4 million
16.3 million
38.2 million
10.5 million
21.6 million
5.4 million
2.0 million
43.0 million
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Sweden
UK
needed to adopt
Total EU27

10
29
a majority of states
casting 232 votes
345

19
78

1.83%
12.24%

785

9.0 million
60.0 million

490 million

Votes and population from European Union, The European Union: A Guide for Americans (2006), p. 4.
[Note: If approved (its future was uncertain in June 2009), the Treaty of Lisbon specifies that after 1 August
2014 adoption of decisions taken by Qualified Majority Voting will require yes votes from 55% (15) of the
member states having 65% of the EU’s combined population. A blocking vote (opposition sufficient to keep
supporters from meeting the population criterion) will need to include negative votes by at least 4 states.]
<end>
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